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Introduction
Among philosophically relevant logical results Zermelo’s semi-categoricity theo-
rem has received little to no attention, perhaps owing to its relative inaccessibility.
The purpose of the present study is to offer a reasonably self-contained presentation
of Zermelo’s theorem that is accessible also to a philosopher with some knowledge
of elementary set theory, say from van Dalen et al. (1975), Krivine and Miller
(1973), Enderton (1977) or Hrbacek and Jech (1999), and of some basic notions
from model theory, for which Rautenberg (2010) or Hodges (1997) is more than
enough.1
With developments in model theory it has become clear that the present-day
canonical foundation of mathematics, that is first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
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fails horribly at unambiguous denotation. It does this to such an extent that in
a modern framework semi-categoricity cannot be interpreted as a result on first-
order models. If we however use full second-order models we salvage external, or
‘true’, semi-categoricity, although we then lose a sound and complete deductive
calculus. With Henkin semantics we do have completeness, but retain only internal
semi-categoricity.
Our approach will be as follows. After some preliminary remarks below concerning
notation, we review some aspects of first-order set theory ZFC in the first section.
The main result here is the existence of natural models of ZFC, assuming the
existence of large cardinals. Section two deals with second-order logic and Henkin
semantics in general and with well-founded structures and Mostowski’s Collapsing
Theorem in particular. The latter is used in section three to prove external semi-
categoricity of second-order set theory ZFC2 with respect to full models. The section
closes with a proof of internal semi-categoricity of ZFC2 with respect to all Henkin
models.
Remark. We use classical logic throughout our investigations. In most of our proofs
it seems there is no easy way around this, especially with respect to the excluded
middle, although proving this use is essential is another matter altogether. Furthermore,
intuitionistic and constructive set theory differ in some important respects from classical
set theory. Adding for example forms of foundation to constructive set theory leads
to the excluded middle with respect to bounded formulae or even full classical ZF
(depending on the formulation of the foundation axiom to be added), as does assuming
the class of ordinals is linearly ordered (see (Aczel and Rathjen, 2001)).
There is of course a rich and interesting discussion concerning the proper foundations
of mathematics, going back to the difficulties Cantor had with his contemporaries
followed by the foundational crisis surrounding Frege and Russell and by Brouwer’s
polemics, resulting in non-classical logics and set theories.2 Pursuing this any further
would however lead us too far afield.
Before continuing I would like to acknowledge the academic staff of both the
Institute of Philosophy and the Mathematical Institute of Leiden University for their
inspiring expertise. Specifically, I sincerely thank my supervisor Göran Sundholm
for his enduring and knowledgeable guidance during the long process that has been
the writing of this thesis. I am furthermore grateful to my family and friends for
their endless love, help and support.
Preliminaries. Let Set be the class of all sets. We assume standard set-theoretic
notions in our metatheory on Set. Let σ be the signature consisting of the symbol
∈, which is sufficient to write the first- as well as the second-order formalization of
our set theory. Fix the standard, countable set of first- and second-order variables,
and collect them in the set Var. We agree that all first-order variables are lower case
of the form a, b, . . . and that all second-order relational and functional variables
are upper case of the form R,S, . . . and lower case of the form f, g, . . . respectively.
Together with our standard logical connectives and quantifiers this induces the
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formal language L, where the difference between first- and second-order should be
clear from context.
If M is a model in a signature τ and ξ a symbol in τ we write ξM for the
interpretation of ξ in M or even just ξ if the meaning is clear. Notice there is a
distinction between well-formed formulae in L and formulae in our metatheory.
Thus, x ∈ y can be an informal statement about given sets x, y or a well-formed
formula, to be interpreted in a model in the signature σ with free variables x, y.
As is customary, we do not distinguish between models and their underlying
domains. Thus we write x ∈ M to mean x is an element of the domain associated to
M. Note Rautenberg (2010) and Hodges (1997) differ on the question what exactly
a model is: Rautenberg distinguishes between models and structures but Hodges
does not.3 The difference however is only important in the case of open formulae,
and need not bother us for it disappears when working informally, as we do. Thus
if M is a model and ϕ(x) a formula with free variable x, we say M |= ∃xϕ(x) iff
there is some x ∈ M such that M |= ϕ(x).4
Finally, we denote the class of ordinals by Ord and write them as α, β etc..5
The cumulative hierarchy (of Set) is written as V0, V1, . . . , Vω, . . . and their union
as V. It is a known result that Set = V holds.6 Recall that every element of Set
has a well-defined rank, i.e. for all x ∈ Set there is a minimal α ∈ Ord such that
x ∈ Vα+1, written as rank x, for which it holds that x ∈ y implies rank x < rank y.
For a set of ordinals A we write ⋃A as supA.
1. First-order Set Theory
Let Replacement and Separation be the axiom schemata of (first-order) replace-
ment and separation of ZFC respectively, and write Extensionality for the axiom
of extensionality, likewise for the other axioms. We us the common definitional
extension of our language consisting of the symbols ⋃,⋂,P ,⊂, etc.. Thus, we
are justified in using these symbols when they are convenient, but can prove our
metatheoretic results by reducing everything to formulae written in σ.
1.1. Inaccessible Cardinals & Natural Models. In what follows we review
natural models of ZFC, assuming the existence of sufficiently large cardinals.
Definition 1.1.1. A cardinal number pi is called inaccessible if it is uncountable
and if it is:
(1) A regular cardinal, i.e. for all ordinals α < pi and f : α → pi arbitrary we
have sup f [α] < pi;
(2) A strong limit cardinal, i.e. for any cardinal κ < pi we have |Pκ| < pi.
Remark. Note that an infinite cardinal pi is regular iff it equals its own cofinality, i.e.
the smallest possible cardinality of any set A of ordinals such that A ⊂ pi = supA is pi
itself (Enderton, 1977, Cor. 9R).
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Definition 1.1.2. For any ordinal number α, write Mα for the σ-structure that
has Vα as domain and interprets ∈ as ∈ on Vα. We call Mα a natural model with
characteristic α.
The assumption that an inaccessible cardinal exists leads to a natural model of
ZFC. Because this is a well-known result, we state the theorem and only sketch the
proof.7
Theorem 1.1.3 (Natural First-Order Models). If pi is an inaccessible cardinal,
then Mpi |= ZFC.
Proof. The most interesting argument concerns the axiom schema of Replacement,
which we save for last. First, for all α > 0 it holds that Mα |= Extensionality +
Regularity + Union, since we have Extensionality and Regularity in our metatheory
and since natural models are transitive. If λ is any limit ordinal, then we also have
Mλ |= Pairing+Power+Choice. One again uses that Pairing, Power Set and Choice
hold in the metatheory and observes these ‘operations’ only finitely increase the
ranks of the sets involved. If β > ω, then also Mβ |= Infinity, for Vβ then contains
ω, which indeed is infinite.
We claim thatMλ |= Separation for any limit ordinal λ, meaning any instantiation
of the schema Separation holds inMλ. To see this, let ϕ(x, ~y, a) and a, y1, y2, . . . , yn ∈
Vλ be given. Define b as {x ∈ a | ϕ(x, ~y, a)}, which is a set by Separation on a in
our metatheory. From b ⊂ a and the fact that λ is a limit ordinal we deduce b ∈ Vλ.
Because ϕ was arbitrary, this implies Mλ |= Separation.
Now suppose pi is inaccessible. We will need the following two facts (the first is
shown after the current proof, the latter is obvious):
(1) For any x ∈ Vpi we have |x| < pi because pi is inaccessible;
(2) For all ordinals α and sets x we have rank x < α iff x ∈ Vα.
Let ψ(x, ~y, a, z) be a first-order formula, and moreover suppose y1, y2, . . . , yn, a ∈
Vpi are such that for all x ∈ a and all z1, z2 ∈ Vpi, if ψ(x, ~y, a, z1) and ψ(x, ~y, a, z2)
both hold in Mpi, then Mpi |= z1 = z2. Thus, informally, the formula ψ with
parameters y1, . . . yn, a induces a functional relation x 7→ z in Mpi of which the
domain is a subset of a. We need to show that inside Mpi the image of this relation
forms a set. Therefore, in order to prove the instantiation of Replacement on ψ in
Mpi, we need an element b ∈ Vpi such that
∀z ∈ Vpi(z ∈ b⇔ ∃x ∈ a(ψ(x, ~y, a, z))).
Intuitively, this is a strong claim, because we have no control over the image under
this functional relation of the elements in its domain, and thus the rank may
increase dramatically, which is why we need pi to be sufficiently big.
Define f as {〈x, z〉 ∈ Vpi×Vpi | x ∈ a∧ψ(x, ~y, a, z)}, which is a set by Separation
in our metatheory. From the assumption on ψ it follows that f is a surjective
function dom f → ran f . Observe it suffices to show ran f ∈ Vpi, for then we can
take b = ran f in the above claim.
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To see the former indeed holds, i.e. that ran f ∈ Vpi, let first S be the set
{rank f(x) | x ∈ dom f} ⊂ pi by Separation and observe that |S| ≤ |dom f | holds.
Moreover, from a ∈ Vpi it follows that |a| < pi by the first fact above. Combining
this with dom f ⊂ a yields
|S| ≤ |dom f | ≤ |a| < pi.
Now with S ⊂ pi this implies supS < pi, because pi is inaccessible, so in particular
regular. From rank f(x) ≤ supS it follows that f(x) ∈ VsupS+1 for all x ∈ dom f ,
using the second fact above. So ran f ⊂ VsupS+1 and, because pi is a limit ordinal,
rank ran f ≤ supS + 1 < pi holds, showing that indeed ran f ∈ Vpi.
To conclude, if pi is an inaccessible cardinal, then in particular it is an uncountable
limit ordinal (for it is an uncountable cardinal number), so Mpi |= ZFC, which was
to be shown. 
Note that in the proof above the fact that an inaccessible cardinal is a strong
limit ordinal has not been used explicitly. It is however used in the proof below,
and hence implicitly also in the proof above.
Lemma 1.1.4. If pi is an inaccessible cardinal and x ∈ Vpi, then |x| < pi.
Proof. Note there is a ξ < pi such that x ∈ Vξ. We show that |Vξ| < pi by induction
on ξ. Note ξ = 0 is impossible and ξ = 1 is trivial. If ξ = β + 1 for some ordinal
β, then |Vβ| < pi holds by the induction hypothesis, and |Vξ| = |PVβ| < pi holds
because pi is a strong limit ordinal. If on the other hand ξ is a limit ordinal, then
consider the function f : ξ → pi, mapping γ ∈ ξ to |Vγ| (which is well-defined by the
induction hypothesis). Because pi is a regular cardinal, this gives us sup f [ξ] < pi,
i.e. |Vξ| ≤ ⋃γ<ξ|Vγ| < pi. Thus, from x ∈ Vξ ( Vpi follows |x| ≤ |Vξ| < pi as desired
(using transitivity of Vξ). 
1.2. First-order Models of Set Theory. LetM be the class of all models of
ZFC. An obvious question to ask is whether every M ∈ M is a natural model of
characteristic κ with κ an inaccessible cardinal. More generally, one can wonder
about the possibilities of |M|. Observe that Zermelo himself addressed these prob-
lems in 1930, claiming that any model of his set theory interpreting ∈ as ∈ must
be of the form Mα with α an inaccessible cardinal.8
On the other hand, we have the well known Skolem’s paradox, asserting that
if ZFC is consistent, it has a countable model. This is a result of the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorems, implying that a theory in L which has an infinite model has a
model of every infinite cardinality, which we will not prove here.9 However, it must
be noted that despite its name, no contradiction follows from Skolem’s paradox.
Although it is true one can show the existence of uncountable sets from ZFC using
natural deduction, what one in effect does by such a proof is showing that for every
model M of ZFC one has sets x, y ∈ M such that both are infinite, but no bijection
inside M exists between x and y.10 From Skolem’s paradox it follows that there
can very well be a bijection between x and y outside M, i.e. in our metatheory.
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Perhaps the most paradoxical feat is then that Zermelo claimed every model must
be of inaccessible characteristic. How could this be true in the light of Skolem’s
paradox? Of course, Zermelo was well aware of Skolem’s remarks concerning the
apparent contradiction between the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems and the deduction
of the existence of uncountable sets from ZFC (Ebbinghaus, 2006). In fact, Zermelo
sharply rejects any possible finitistic conclusions one could try and draw from
Skolem’s paradox:
The ‘ultrafinite antinomies of set theory’, to which scientific re-
actionaries and anti-mathematicians appeal in their fight against
set theory with such eager passion, are only apparent ‘contradic-
tions’, due only to a confusion between set theory itself, which is
non-categorically determined by its axioms, and the individual models
representing it. [. . . ] Thus, instead of leading to constriction and
mutilation, the set-theoretic ‘antinomies’ lead, when understood cor-
rectly, to an as yet unforeseeable development and enrichment of the
mathematical science. (Zermelo, 1930)
A proposed solution to the problem of indeterminacy of our set theory lies in
the use of second-order logic.11 Indeed, as Kanamori (2010) remarks, the final
formulation of Zermelo’s work on axiomatic set theory (Zermelo, 1930) is to be
regarded in a second-order fashion and as a reaction to the apparent anomalies found
by Skolem in his first-order casting of Zermelo’s earlier works on set theory, such as
(Zermelo, 1904). As we will see in the next section, with the aid of quantification
over classes of sets we can indeed show that every full model of second-order
set theory is isomorphic to Mpi for some inaccessible cardinal pi. Thus, although
set theory may be non-categorically determined by its axioms, it is nevertheless
‘semi-categorical’ if we understand it in a suitable second-order fashion.
Before we continue, let us mention some results that are ordinarily proven using
natural deduction from ZFC, but which, after the necessary relativizations, hold
for all models of ZFC. These results will be used in the proof of semi-categoricity.12
Notation. For any σ-structure M and x ∈ M, let Ex be the set {y ∈ M | y ∈M x} and
call it the extension of x.
Definition 1.2.1. Let M |= ZFC. An element α ∈ M is called an ordinal in M if
it is transitive and totally ordered with respect to ∈M. Define OM as the set of all
ordinals in M. Call x ∈ M well-ordered in M if Ex is totally ordered by ∈M and for
any s ⊂M x such that s 6= ∅M there is some minimal element in Es with respect to
∈M. For y ∈ M call y ∪M {y}M the successor of y and denote it by Sy.
Let M be a model of ZFC, interpreting ∈ as say . Then we have a copy of the
natural numbers in M, meaning there is an ω ∈ M such that z  ω iff z = Sn∅M for
some n ∈ N. Now let α be in OM. Then α is well-ordered in M while Eα and OM
are both well-ordered by . Furthermore, we have an internal cumulative hierarchy
of M, meaning we can define V M0 := ∅M, for ordinals β in M the set V MSβ := PMV Mβ ,
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and for limit ordinals λ in M the set V Mλ :=
⋃M
αλ V
M
α . Then for each x ∈ M there
is some ordinal ζ in M such that x  V Mζ . We will abusively refer to this fact by
writing M = ⋃Mξ∈OM V Mξ .
2. Second-order Logic & Well-founded Structures
There are many flavors of second-order logic available, not all of which are
equivalent in the theorems they prove nor the models they allow. Naturally, also
the metatheoretic results that hold for these flavors differ from one another. We
will be considering Henkin semantics for the following reasons. On the one hand,
in this setting full second-order logic can easily be captured, which we will use for
the proof of external semi-categoricity. On the other hand, Henkin semantics has
some nice metatheoretic properties that also allow for an internal semi-categoricity
of second-order set theory. In our second-order logic we follow Shapiro (1991);
Väänänen (2001, 2012); Väänänen and Wang (2015), and indicate some specific
references where necessary.
Notation. In the following, fix a signature τ consisting of a binary relation symbol <.
2.1. Comprehension & Henkin Semantics.
Definition 2.1.1. The second-order axiom of Comprehension reads, for any second-
order formula ϕ not containing R free:
Comprehension. ∃R∀~x(R~x↔ ϕ(~x)).
We also have Second-order Choice, reading:
Choice2. ∀R(∀~x∃yR(~x, y)→ ∃f∀~xR(~x, f(~x))).
A Henkin model is a pair 〈M,G〉 with M a first-order model and G a collection of
relations and functions satisfying Choice2 + Comprehension. The latter determines
the range of our second-order variables and contains, by comprehension, all second-
order definable functions and relations of M. If we take all relations and functions
on M we get a full second-order model, which will be denoted simply by M.
Our second-order deductive system will consist of Choice2 + Comprehension and
some straightforward rules for manipulating quantifiers and logical connectives, as
given in (Shapiro, 1991, p. 66).
Remark. Observe with Choice2 we can also derive Comprehension for functions:
fComprehension. ∀R(∀~x∃!yR(~x, y)→ ∃f∀~xR(~x, f(~x))),
where the converse statement, that every function has a graph, can be derived from
Comprehension (Shapiro, 1991, p. 67). Thus, giving second-order functional relations or
second-order functions amounts to the same thing. Also observe that if R is functional
on S we can derive the existence of an f which is R on S. Because of this, we will be
abusing some notation and consider second-order definable partial functional relations
as second-order definable partial functions.
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The benefit of Henkin semantics, in contrast to full second-order logic, is that it
allows for a complete proof system and is even compact, as shown by Henkin (1950).
This is due to the fact that Henkin semantics can be reduced to many-sorted logic,
which in turn can be reduced to first-order logic (see Väänänen (2001, 2014, §4),
Shapiro (1991, Thm. 4.16, Thm. 4.17) and van Dalen (1994, § 4) for a modern
presentation of these facts). However, we shall see that the downside of compactness
is that it prohibits external semi-categoricity with respect to all Henkin models.
2.2. Well-founded Structures: Internal or External? Models of set theory
are intended to be well-founded. This means every nonempty subset of such a
model should have an ∈-minimal element or, what amounts to the same thing, they
should not allow for infinite descending ∈-chains. However, we need to be careful
with respect to the viewpoint from which we consider well-foundedness. For we
have that ZFC proves that every nonempty x contains an ∈-minimal element and
disproves the existence of infinite descending ∈-chains that are first-order definable.
Akin to Skolem’s paradox, with a standard compactness argument we can however
prove the existence of models for ZFC that do have infinite descending ∈-chains
seen from the outside.
We want our models of second-order set theory to be truly well-founded in the
following sense.
Definition 2.2.1 (External Well-foundedness). A Henkin model 〈M,G〉 in τ is
said to be well-founded if every nonempty X ⊂ M has a <-minimal element.
The reason we want this to hold is that we can perform well-founded induction
on such models, which we will be needing in the proof of external semi-categoricity.
Or, more precisely, well-founded induction allows for a certain representation of
full models of second-order set theory by means of Mostowski’s result below. This
will drastically ease the proof of external semi-categoricity.
We also have a notion of internal well-foundedness with respect to Henkin models.
This is used in the proof of internal semi-categoricity but defined below to contrast
it with the external variant.
Notation. Extend the signature σ to σˆ by adding two unitary predicates V and V ′,
and two binary predicates  and ′. Furthermore, we extend our language L with the
logical (second-order) symbols ⊂,⋂,×, etc., with obvious interpretations (where the
difference with the extralogical versions should be clear from context). We agree that
for a Henkin model 〈M,G〉 in σˆ it always holds that (the interpretations of) V, V ′, , ′
are in G and that 〈M,G〉 |=  ⊂ V × V ∧ ′ ⊂ V ′ × V ′. We will also be committing
the sin of writing 〈M,G〉 |= ~x ∈ R while meaning 〈M,G〉 |= R(~x), where the difference
with the extralogical ∈ should again be clear from context (we only do this when
considering internal models of ZFC2, where the extralogical ∈ does not play any role).
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Definition 2.2.2 (Internal Well-foundedness). Let 〈M,G〉 be a Henkin model in
σˆ. We say 〈V, 〉 is well-founded in 〈M,G〉 if
〈M,G〉 |= ∀R((R ⊂ V ∧ ∃xRx)→ ∃m(Rm ∧ ¬∃y(Ry ∧ y  m))),
and likewise for 〈V ′, ′〉.
Remark. Let 〈M,G〉 be a Henkin model in σˆ. Then 〈V, 〉 is intended to be an internal
model of second-order set theory, which roughly means that inside 〈M,G〉 it behaves
like a model of ZFC2 with domain V and interpretation  of ∈.
Note if 〈M,G〉 is externally well-founded with respect to  then 〈V, 〉 must obviously
be well-founded in 〈M,G〉. The converse fails however, for Henkin models can simply
interpret V vacuously, while there are such models that are not externally well-founded,
as we shall soon see.
2.3. Mostowski’s Collapsing Theorem. The following is taken from (Jech,
2003, §6), with some necessary adjustments to our goals. In this part, we fix a
Henkin model 〈M,G〉 in τ . For x ∈ M let again Ex be the extension {y ∈ M | y < x}
of x.
Definition 2.3.1. Introduce the following terminology with respect to 〈M,G〉:
(1) Call 〈M,G〉 extensional if for all x, y ∈ M distinct Ex 6= Ey holds;
(2) The model 〈M,G〉 is said to be transitive if it interprets < as ∈ and if x ∈ M
implies x ⊂ M.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Well-Founded Induction). Suppose 〈M,G〉 is transitive and Φ ⊂
M is such that for all x ∈ M it holds that Ex ⊂ Φ implies x ∈ Φ. Then Φ = M.
Proof. First observe 〈M,G〉 is well-founded. For if X ⊂ M is nonempty, by regularity
in our metatheory we may take y ∈ X such that y∩X = ∅, which is ∈- and whence
<-minimal in X.
Now let Y be M − Φ. Suppose Y is nonempty. Because 〈M,G〉 is well-founded,
we can pick m ∈ Y minimal with respect to < in Y . By minimality we must have
Em ⊂ Φ, implying m ∈ Φ, which is impossible. Whence Y is empty and the claim
follows. 
Remark. If 〈M,G〉 is well-founded, we can define the rank of an element x ∈ M, written
as rank x, by induction by means of the function ρ : M → Ord, sending x ∈ M to
sup{ρ(y) + 1 | y ∈ Ex} (Jech, 2003, Thm. 2.27).
Lemma 2.3.3. If two transitive Henkin models in τ are isomorphic, they are
identical. Moreover, transitive Henkin models only allow trivial automorphisms.
Proof. This is a simple well-founded induction, see (Jech, 2003, Thm. 6.7). 
Theorem 2.3.4 (Mostowski’s Collapsing Theorem). Suppose 〈M,G〉 is well-founded
and extensional. Then there is a unique transitive Henkin model 〈N ,F 〉 in τ and a
unique isomorphism pi between the two.
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Proof. Without loss of generality assume 〈M,G〉 is nonempty. Notice 〈M,G〉 has a
unique <-minimal element, say m ∈ M: it has at least one by well-foundedness and
it is unique by extensionality. Now for x ∈ M define
pi(x) := {pi(z) | z < x}.
We claim pi is a well-defined function on all of M, using well-founded induction. For
this, let Φ be the set of all elements in M on which pi is well-defined. Obviously
pi(m) = ∅ is well-defined. And if x ∈ M is such that pi(y) is well-defined for all
y ∈ Ex, then so is pi(x) by definition of pi. Whence Φ equals M.
Now let N be the image of M under pi, which is a set by Replacement in our
metatheory. Likewise, let F be the relations and functions on N induced by G
under pi. We let 〈N ,F 〉 interpret < as ∈. First observe 〈N ,F 〉 is well-founded.
For if Y ⊂ N is nonempty, we can take X ⊂ M nonempty as pi−1[Y ] and take
a <-minimal element q ∈ X. Then pi(q) ∈ Y is ∈-minimal, for if y ∈ Y is such
that y ∈ pi(q), then we have y = pi(z) for some z < q by definition of pi. Hence
z ∈ pi−1[Y ] = X, which contradicts the minimality of q.
We claim that the extensionality of 〈M,G〉 implies pi is injective. To derive a
contradiction, suppose this is not the case. Then because 〈N ,F 〉 is well-founded, we
can take z ∈ N of minimal rank such that there are x, y ∈ M distinct in the fiber
of pi above z. By extensionality, it follows Ex 6= Ey, and we may assume without
loss of generality there is a u ∈ M in Ex but not in Ey. Observe pi(u) ∈ pi(x) = pi(y)
follows from u < x. By definition of pi we then also have a v ∈ Ey such that
pi(u) = pi(v), but for which u 6= v must hold because u ∈ Ex − Ey while v ∈ Ey.
But this contradicts the assumption that z was of minimal rank, because pi(u) ∈ z
implies rank pi(u) < rank z.
It is clear pi is also surjective, and hence a bijection. To see it is a homomorphism,
i.e. that x < y iff pi(x) ∈ pi(y), first observe the implication from left to right is
trivial. For the converse, assume pi(x) ∈ pi(y). Then by definition of pi we have that
pi(x) = pi(z) for some z < y. Because pi is bijective, x = z < y holds as desired.
We conclude pi is indeed an isomorphism. Note from this also follows 〈N ,F 〉 is
a Henkin model, and it is clear this model is transitive by construction. Finally,
uniqueness follows from Lemma 2.3.3: if pi′ : 〈M,G〉 → 〈N ′,F ′〉 is an isomorphism
then so is pi′pi−1 : 〈N ,F 〉 → 〈N ′,F ′〉. Whence 〈N ′,F ′〉 is equal to 〈N ,F 〉 and pi′pi−1
is the identity. 
3. Second-order Set Theory
In this section we show our main result: second-order set theory ZFC2 is externally
semi-categorical with respect to full models and internally semi-categorical with
respect to all Henkin models. The former means that for all full models M,N of
ZFC2, we have either an isomorphism from M to an initial segment of N or the
other way around, which is called a quasi-isomorphism. The later means, roughly,
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that in any Henkin model 〈M,G〉 containing structures that behave like models of
ZFC2, such structures are proven to be quasi-isomorphic inside 〈M,G〉.
3.1. Axioms & Natural Models. All but the Separation and Replacement
schemata remain first-order in ZFC2. With the power of second-order logic, these
schemata are replaced by only two axioms, namely the following:
Separation2. ∀R∀~ya∃b(b = {x ∈ a | R(x, ~y, a)});
Replacement2. ∀f∀a∃b∀z(z ∈ b↔ ∃x ∈ a(f(x) = z)).
Remark. Observe, with fComprehension our second-order formalization of Replacement
is equivalent to:
∀R∀a(∀xzz′(x ∈ a ∧R(x, z) ∧R(x, z′)→ z = z′)→ ∃b∀z(z ∈ b↔ ∃x ∈ aR(x, z))).
Proposition 3.1.1. For all Henkin models 〈M,G〉 in σ satisfying ZFC2 we have
M |= ZFC.
Remark. This implies the first-order results mentioned in §1.2 hold in the second-order
case as well.
Proof. Using Comprehension, this is straightforward. 
The following is taken from Kanamori (2008, Thm. 1.3), and goes back to Zermelo
himself. For any ordinal α we let Mα be the full second-order σ-structure with
underlying domain Vα, interpreting ∈ as ∈, and again call it natural.
Theorem 3.1.2. A cardinal κ is inaccessble iff Mκ |= ZFC2.
Proof. For the forward direction the proof is similar to the first-order case.
Conversely, suppose κ is such that Mκ |= ZFC2. We first claim κ must be regular.
Suppose it is not. Then we have an α < κ and an f : α→ κ such that sup f [α] ≥ κ
and, because f [α] ⊂ κ, in fact sup f [α] = κ. Now because f ⊂ α × κ ⊂ V 2κ , with
second-order Replacement we have f [α] ∈ Vκ and thus κ = sup f [α] ∈ Vκ, which is
a contradiction.
Next we show κ must be a strong limit cardinal. Suppose this is not the case.
Then take λ < κ such that κ ≤ |Pλ|. As will be shown below PMκλ = Pλ holds.
But κ ≤ |Pλ| gives us a surjection f : Pλ → κ and thus f [Pλ] = κ ∈ Vκ by
Replacement2, which again gives us a contradiction. 
The next result is needed to complete the prove above, but is also convenient for
the proof of external semi-categoricity and nicely shows exactly where second-order
Separation is used.
Lemma 3.1.3. Let M be a transitive, full model in σ satisfying Separation2+Power.
Then for all x ∈ M we have Px = PMx.
Proof. Let x ∈ M. First note that for all y ∈ M it holds that
y ∈ PMx⇔ y ⊂M x⇔ ∀z ∈ M(z ∈ y ⇒ z ∈ x).
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Now let y be in PMx and z ∈ y. Then because y ∈ M and M is transitive, we also
get that z ∈ M, and hence z ∈ x by definition of PMx, showing Px ⊃ PMx.
Conversely, let y ⊂ x be arbitrary. Then again by transitivity y ⊂ M holds.
Thus x ∩ y equals y, and it is an element of M by Separation2 from x. Because M
interprets ∈ as ∈, it is now clear that y ∈ PMx, showing Px ⊂ PMx. 
3.2. External Semi-categoricity. In contrast to the first-order case, full models
of ZFC2 are always well-founded, as the following result shows.
Proposition 3.2.1. Let M be a full model in σ of ZFC2. Then M is well-founded.
Remark. Observe M |= Replacement2 is necessary for this result to hold, as shown in
(Uzquiano, 1999, Thm. 4), i.e. there are full models N |= ZFC2 − Replacement2 that
are not well-founded.
Proof. Let X ⊂ M be nonempty and ω ∈ M the copy of N in M. Write < for ∈M.
Suppose X has no <-minimal element. Then we have a set y := {xi | xi ∈ M, i < ω}
such that x0 > x1 > x2 . . . . Now with second-order Replacement from ω it follows
there is an y˜ ∈ M with p < y˜ iff p ∈ y for all p ∈ M, and thus there must be a
z ∈ M such that z < y˜ and y˜ ∩M z = ∅M by Regularity, which is impossible. 
All is in place for the proof of external semi-categoricity.
Theorem 3.2.2. Let M be a full model of ZFC2 in σ. Then M is uniquely isomorphic
to the natural model Mκ with κ ∼= OM.
Proof. Observe by Proposition 3.2.1 M is well-founded, and it is obviously exten-
sional. Thus, by Mostowski’s Collapsing Theorem, it is uniquely isomorphic to a
unique transitive Henkin model: itself a full model of ZFC2. So we may assume
without loss of generality that M is transitive. Therefore, by Lemma 3.1.3, for any
x ∈ M it holds that PMx = Px.
Now let κ be the unique ordinal such that OM ∼= κ. Because M is transitive it
interprets ∈ as ∈ and thus OM is in fact equal to κ.
We show by induction that V Mξ = Vξ for any ξ < κ. Obviously, because M is
transitive V M0 = ∅M = ∅ = V0 holds. Now suppose λ < κ is such that V Mα = Vα for
any α < λ. If λ = β + 1 for some ordinal β, then also
V Mλ = PMV Mβ = PV Mβ = PVβ = Vλ.
Next suppose λ is a limit ordinal. Then we have
V Mλ = {x ∈ M | ∃α ∈ OM<λ(x ∈ V Mα )} = {x ∈ M | ∃α < λ(x ∈ Vα)} = M ∩ Vλ.
Therefore, if Vλ ⊂ M, then we indeed have V Mλ = Vλ. To see the former holds, let
x ∈ Vλ be given. Then there is some α < λ such that x ∈ Vα, which is equal to V Mα
by the induction hypothesis, and thus x ∈ V Mα ⊂ M as desired.
Note M is identical to ⋃Mα<κ V Mα , which we have shown to be identical to ⋃Mα<κ Vα.
Now by the same token as above the latter equals M ∩ Vκ, and again we have
Vκ ⊂ M, indeed showing M = Vκ holds. 
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As an immediate consequence of the above we acquire the following.
Corollary 3.2.3 (External Semi-categoricity). The theory ZFC2 is semi-categorical
with respect to full models. That is, for any two such models M,N |= ZFC2 in σ we
can uniquely embed M as an initial segment into N , or the other way around.
Furthermore, we see that the existence of full models for ZFC2 is independent of
ZFC. For by Theorems 3.2.2 and 3.1.2 ZFC2 has full models iff there are inaccessible
cardinals. Because the latter leads to a natural model for ZFC, it is indeed consistent
with ZFC to either assume or negate the existence of such cardinals and hence the
consistency of full second-order set theory.
3.3. Internal Well-foundedness. The above strategy doesn’t work for all Henkin
models, for we can show there are models 〈M,G〉 of ZFC2 that are not externally
well-founded. Simply extend L by adding fresh constants c0, c1, c2, . . . , consider the
sentences c0 3 c1 3 c2 3 . . . 3 ck for k ∈ N>0 and let Σ be the collection of all of
these sentences. Then ZFC2 + Σ is finitely satisfiable by any second-order model of
ZFC2, and thus has a model by compactness. It is readily seen such a model cannot
be externally well-founded.
Notwithstanding the above, we can use the notion of internal well-foundedness
and the fact that second-order set theory has a finite axiomatization to prove
internal semi-categoricity. To see what this means, define in the extended signature
σˆ the second-order sentence ZFC2(V, ), expressing that 〈V, 〉 satisfies all axioms of
ZFC2 relative to 〈V, 〉. Thus, for example, the relativized version of second-order
Seperation becomes:
Separation(V, ). ∀R ⊂ V ∀~ya ∈ V ∃b ∈ V (b = {x  a | R(x, ~y, a)}).
Now ZFC2(V, ) is the conjunction of all relativized versions of the sentences in
ZFC2 (which are indeed finite in number, written as ϕ(V, ) for ϕ ∈ ZFC2). Ditto
for 〈V ′, ′〉.
Before continuing we agree on some more terminology. Let 〈M,G〉 be a Henkin
model in σˆ satisfying the sentence ZFC2(V, ). Thus 〈M,G〉 contains an internal
model of second-order set theory, namely the interpretations of 〈V, 〉, from hereon
simply written as V . Because the set of ordinals of any model of set-theory is
second-order definable, we have a subset Ord ∈ G of M consisting of the ordinals in
V . Likewise, we have an internal copy ω ∈ V of N and an internal empty set (i.e.
an -minimal element in all of V ), written as ∅. Furthermore, for x in V we define
the extension Ex ∈ G of x as {y ∈ V | 〈M,G〉 |= y  x}, and write the internal
power-set simply as Px. If 〈M,G〉 |= ZFC2(V ′, ′), we do the same as above with
respect to 〈V ′, ′〉, but add a prime as in Ord′ ⊂ V ′ etc.. In all these notations the
difference with the ‘real world’ versions should be clear from the context.
Now for any subsets X, Y ∈ G of M such that 〈M,G〉 satisfies  ⊂ X ×X ∧ ′ ⊂
Y × Y , being an isomorphism from 〈X, 〉 to 〈Y, ′〉 inside M is second-order
definable, and thus we have a second-order sentence Iso(pi, 〈X, 〉, 〈Y, ′〉) expressing
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a given pi ∈ G is an isomorphism from 〈X, 〉 to 〈Y, ′〉. Likewise, we can express an
embedding Embed(ι, 〈X, 〉, 〈Y, ′〉) as an isomorphism ι : X → ι[X] with ι[X] ⊂ Y
downwards-closed, i.e. such that x ∈ ι[X] ∧ y ′ x implies y ∈ ι[X]. If τ ⊂ X × Y is
a relation such that Embed(τ, 〈X, 〉, 〈Y, ′〉) ∨ Embed(τ−1, 〈Y, ′〉, 〈X, 〉) holds, we
call it a quasi-isomorphism, which we write as Qiso(τ, 〈X, 〉, 〈Y, ′〉).
To prove internal semi-categoricity, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let 〈M,G〉 be a Henkin model in σˆ satisfying ZFC2(V, ). Then
〈V, 〉 is well-founded in 〈M,G〉.
Proof. Let U ∈ G be a nonempty subset of V . Take x in U and define x¯ as the
transitive closure ⋃n∈N ∪nx of x, which is an element of V by Replacement2(V, ).
With Separation2(V, ), take w ∈ V such that Ew is {y ∈ V | y ∈ U ∩ E x¯}. Finally,
by Regularity(V, ) let z  w be such that z ∩ w = ∅.
Observe zw implies z ∈ U and zx¯, where the latter implies z ⊂ x¯ by transitivity
of x¯. We claim z is -minimal in U . To the contrary, suppose t ∈ U is such that
t  z. Then t ∈ E x¯ and thus t  w by construction of w, contradicting w ∩ z = ∅. So
no such t ∈ U exists and z is as desired. 
3.4. Internal Semi-categoricity. Recall for 〈M,G〉 in σˆ satisfying ZFC2(V, ) we
have an internal cumulative hierarchy, with stages written as Vα ∈ V for α ∈ Ord.
As a corollary of the above, we note it is provable in 〈M,G〉 that this is indeed
the cumulative hierarchy of V in that ∀x ∈ V ∃α ∈ Ord(x  Vα) holds in 〈M,G〉.
Likewise with respect to 〈V ′, ′〉.
Using internal well-foundedness we first acquire internal semi-categoricity with
respect to the ordinals. The proof is taken from (Shapiro, n.d.).
Proposition 3.4.1. Let 〈M,G〉 be a Henkin model in σˆ satisfying the sentences
ZFC2(V, ) and ZFC2(V ′, ′). Then 〈M,G〉 |= ∃piQiso(pi, 〈Ord, 〉, 〈Ord′, ′〉).
Proof. For first-order variables x, y and a binary relation R define the formula
ψ(x, y,R) := ∀z  x∃w ′ y(R(z, w)) ∧ ∀w ′ y∃z  x(R(z, w)).
Call a set R ⊂ M × M ordinal-closed if 〈∅, ∅′〉 ∈ R, if R ⊂ Ord×Ord′ and if
furthermore for all 〈x, y〉 ∈ Ord×Ord′ it holds that ψ(x, y, R) implies R(x, y).
Observe Ord×Ord′ ∈ G is ordinal-closed. Now define
T :=
⋂{R ∈ G | R is ordinal-closed}.
Note we have T ∈ G because being ordinal-closed is second-order definable. It is
clear that 〈∅, ∅′〉 ∈ T and T ⊂ Ord×Ord′ hold. Now let 〈x, y〉 be in Ord×Ord′
such that ψ(x, y, T ) holds. Then 〈x, y〉 is in each ordinal-closed R, whence T (x, y)
holds, showing T is itself ordinal-closed.
Let 〈x, y〉 be in T . We claim that ψ(x, y, T ), i.e.
(?) For all z  x there is w ′ y such that T (z, w) and, conversely, for all w ′ y
there is z  x such that T (z, w).
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To the contrary, suppose ¬ψ(x, y, T ). Then trivially 〈x, y〉 6= 〈∅, ∅′〉, so if we define
T ′ as T − {〈x, y〉} then we have 〈∅, ∅′〉 ∈ T ′ and T ′ ⊂ Ord×Ord′. Now suppose
〈p, q〉 in Ord×Ord′ is such that ψ(p, q, T ′) holds. Then this implies T (p, q) and we
clearly have 〈p, q〉 6= 〈x, y〉, so in fact T ′(p, q) holds as well. Thus T ′ is ordinal-closed,
giving us T ⊂ T ′, which is impossible.
To see T is a bijective relation, suppose this is not the case. Let then Φ be
{x ∈ Ord | ∃yy′(T (x, y) ∧ T (x, y′) ∧ y 6= y′)}, which is second-order definable.
Because 〈V, 〉 is well-founded in 〈M,G〉, we have an -minimal a ∈ Φ, say with
distinct b1, b2 ∈ Ord′ such that 〈a, b1〉, 〈a, b2〉 ∈ T and b1 ′ b2. Then define
S := T − {〈a, b2〉}.
We show S is ordinal-closed. Obviously S ⊂ Ord×Ord′. Furthermore, b1 ′ b2
so b2 6= ∅′, implying 〈∅, ∅′〉 ∈ S. Now suppose 〈p, q〉 ∈ Ord×Ord′ is such that
ψ(p, q, S) holds. Observe we have T (p, q), and assume p = a ∧ q = b2. Then, by
claim (?), the minimality of a and the fact that T (a, b1), for all x  a there is a
unique yx ′ b1 with T (x, yx). Suppose xa is such that T (x, b1). Then by uniqueness
of yx we must have b1 = yx ′ b1, which is impossible. Therefore, because b1 ′ b2,
not for all y ′ b2 there is an x  a such that T (x, y), contradicting the claim (?) and
T (a, b2). This implies p 6= a ∨ q 6= b2 and thus S(p, q). As desired, this means S is
ordinal closed, implying T ⊂ S, which is impossible.
We have seen Φ is empty. We can do the same with respect to Φ′ defined
as {y ∈ Ord′ | ∃xx′(T (x, y) ∧ T (x′, y) ∧ x 6= x′}, this time using that 〈V ′, ′〉 is
well-founded in 〈M,G〉, to see Φ′ is empty. Therefore T was bijective after all.
Let Ψ resp. Ψ′ be the sets {x ∈ Ord | ∃y ∈ Ord′ T (x, y)} resp. {y ∈ Ord′ | ∃x ∈
OrdT (x, y)}, which are second-order definable. To see the domain of T is Ord or
the range of T is Ord′, suppose Ψ 6= Ord. Then take m minimal in Ord−Ψ and
observe for all x ∈ Ord it holds m  x ∧ x ∈ Ψ implies m ∈ Ψ by claim (?), which
is impossible by the assumption on m. Now suppose Ψ′ 6= Ord′. Again let n be
minimal in Ord′−Ψ′ and observe for all y ∈ Ord′ that n ′ y ∧ y ∈ Ψ′ is impossible.
Now for each x  m there must be some y ∈ Ord′ such that T (x, y) by minimality
of m, and we have just seen for such y it must hold y ′ n. Likewise, for all y ′ n
there is x  m with T (x, y). Or, in other words, ψ(m,n, T ) and therefore T (m,n)
holds, using T is ordinal-closed. This, however, contradicts the assumption on m.
The above implies Ψ = Ord or Ψ′ = Ord′. Without loss of generality assume
Ψ = Ord, so that T induces a function pi : Ord→ Ord′ by fComprehension. What
remains to show for the claim Qiso(pi, 〈Ord, 〉, 〈Ord′, ′〉) is that pi is structure-
preserving and that pi[Ord] is downwards-closed. Both however are immediate
consequences of (?), which finishes our proof. 
All is in place for our final result. The strategy will be similar as the previous
proof and is inspired by (Väänänen and Wang, 2015).
Theorem 3.4.2 (Internal Semi-categoricity). If 〈M,G〉 is a Henkin model in σˆ such
that 〈M,G〉 |= ZFC2(V, ) ∧ ZFC2(V ′, ′), then 〈M,G〉 |= ∃τQiso(τ, 〈V, 〉, 〈V ′, ′〉).
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Proof. By Proposition 3.4.1, take pi ∈ G such that 〈M,G〉 satisfies the sentence
Qiso(pi, 〈Ord, 〉, 〈Ord′, ′〉) and let Π ⊂ Ord×Ord′ be pi considered as binary
relation. Without loss of generality assume the domain of pi is all of Ord. For a
binary relation R define the formula
ψ(x, y,R) := ∀z  x∃w ′ y(R(z, w)) ∧ ∀w ′ y∃z  x(R(z, w)).
Now call a binary R ∈ G set-closed if Π ⊂ R and if for all 〈x, y〉 ∈ V × V ′ it holds
ψ(x, y, R) implies R(x, y). Define
T :=
⋂{R ∈ G | R is set-closed}.
Observe T ∈ G. Because Π is contained in every set-closed set and V × V ′ itself is
set-closed we have Π ⊂ T ⊂ V × V ′. We claim
(?) ∀〈x, y〉 ∈ V × V ′(ψ(x, y, T )⇔ T (x, y)).
The forward direction is trivial. For the converse, suppose T (x, y) and ¬ψ(x, y, T )
hold and let T ′ be T − {〈x, y〉}. Observe, if Π(x, y) holds then ψ(x, y,Π) by the
proof of Proposition 3.4.1 and hence ψ(x, y, T ) because Π ⊂ T , which is impossible.
Thus we see that ¬Π(x, y), i.e. that Π ⊂ T ′. By the same argument as given in the
proof of Proposition 3.4.1 we derive T ′ ⊂ T , which is impossible. Whence T (x, y)
implies ψ(x, y, T ) for all 〈x, y〉 ∈ V × V ′.
In the following, for α ∈ Ord write the restriction T |EVα⊂ EVα × E ′V ′pi(α) of T
simply as T |α (which is well-defined, as shown below). For the remainder of the
proof, we employ the following strategy. We first show that T is:
i. Functional;
ii. An injective relation;
iii. Structure-preserving.
Then we show iv. that for all α ∈ Ord it holds T |α is an isomorphism to conclude
that T is a quasi-isomorphism.
i. Let Φ be {x ∈ V | ∃yy′ ∈ V ′(y 6= y′ ∧T (x, y)∧T (x, y′)}. Then Φ is second-order
definable. Thus, by Lemma 3.3.1, if Φ is nonempty it has a minimal element, say
m ∈ V . Take y, y′ ∈ V ′ distinct such that T (m, y) and T (m, y′). Because E ′y 6= E ′y′,
we may assume without loss of generality there is a u ∈ V ′ such that u ′ y holds
but not u ′ y′.
Let z  m be such that T (z, u) (using T (m, y), claim (?) and u ′ y). Likewise,
using z m and T (m, y′), let w ′ y′ be such that T (z, w). Observe ¬(u ′ y′)∧w ′ y′
implies u 6= w, and thus we have found a z ∈ Φ but with z m, which is impossible
by minimality of m. So Φ is empty and T is functional.
Because T is functional we may consider it as a function τ : domT → ranT ,
which is just notational convenience in the remainder of the proof.
ii. To show T is injective, do the same as above but this time with respect to
{y ∈ V ′ | ∃xx′ ∈ V (x 6= x′ ∧ T (x, y) ∧ T (x′, y))}.
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iii. Suppose 〈x, y〉, 〈p, q〉 ∈ V × V ′ are such that T (x, y) and T (p, q) hold. Suppose
x  p. Then with (?) we have a w ′ q such that T (x,w), and y = w ′ q follows from
functionality of T . The converse if similar, using injectivity of T . Therefore, T is
structure-preserving.
iv. We proceed by transfinite induction, which is justified by Lemma 3.3.1. For the
base case observe EV0 = ∅ = E ′V ′pi(0), so we have nothing to prove. Now suppose
T |α is an isomorphism. To show T |α+1 is one as well, by (i) - (iii) it suffices to show
the restriction T |α+1 is well-defined and surjective.
For the first claim let x ∈ Vα+1 be given. Observe 〈M,G〉 |= ∀z  x(z  Vα) so
Ex ⊂ EVα. By induction hypothesis we have τ [Ex] ⊂ E ′V ′pi(α). Moreover, τ [Ex] is
second-order definable. Thus, using 〈M,G〉 |= Separation(V ′, ′), we have an y ∈ V ′
such that
〈M,G〉 |= ∀w ∈ V ′(w ′ y ↔ (w ∈ E ′V ′pi(α) ∩ τ [Ex])).
We show that T (x, y) holds. By (?), it suffices to prove ψ(x, y, T ). So first suppose
we are given a z  x. Then by induction hypothesis there is a unique w ∈ E ′V ′pi(α)
such that T (z, w). Now because w ∈ τ [Ex], by construction of y indeed w ′ y.
Conversely, suppose q ′ y is given. Then q ∈ τ [Ex] by construction of y and hence
there is a p  x such that T (p, q). Therefore T (x, y) indeed holds. Furthermore
y ⊂′ V ′pi(α) and thus y ′ V ′pi(α+1), showing T |α+1 is well-defined.
For the second claim, by symmetry, for given y ∈ V ′pi(α+1) we derive the existence
of an x ∈ Vα+1 such that T (x, y), so T |α+1 is surjective as well.
The case where λ ∈ Ord is a limit ordinal such that T |α is an isomorphism for
all α  λ is straightforward. As noted, with (i) - (iii) this implies (iv).
With V = ⋃α∈Ord EVα and (i) - (iv) we see τ : V → V ′ is an isomorphism onto
its image. What remains to show for the claim τ is a quasi-isomorphism is that
τ [V ] is downwards-closed. But this is easy by (?), which concludes our proof. 
3.5. Discussion. We have seen full second-order logic allows for a semi-categorical
set theory. However, as mentioned, we lack a sound and complete decision calculus
for second-order logic. One can show this via categoricity of full second-order
arithmetic in combination with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. On the other
hand, completeness with respect to Henkin semantics is due to the fact that it can
be reduced to first-order logic. Let us first pause to reflect on these matters.
There are two questions I want to touch on shortly. The first is why any one
should care about categoricity at all. The second is what semi-categoricity in the
context of set theory shows. For the first, note that in many theories (such as
the theory of groups) one of course is not interested in categoricity. But with
foundational theories like arithmetic or set theory, the fear is that if our models are
allowed to behave wildly, we cannot rule out pathological behaviors trickling down
to the rest of our mathematics. Thus, if we are, say, doing arithmetic on N and
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someone asks us the ludicrous question what N precisely is, we of course say it is
the set {0, 1, 2, . . . }, taken with ordinary addition and multiplication as + resp. ·.
But then our hypothetical friend demands us to be formal. We are doing mathe-
matics after all. So we give him a set of axioms, such as first-order Peano arithmetic,
and say:
These are the rules of arithmetic. When we say we are doing arith-
metic, what we actually mean is we are following these rules using
only strict logical principles.
After some thought, our surprisingly witty partner remarks that he has found a set
M with operations +′, ·′ and elements 0′, 1′ that exactly satisfies our axioms, but
which is itself uncountable. Now, if we really want to do arithmetic on the natural
numbers, we are left with no choice but to cast our theory in second-order logic.
We show him a proof of categoricity and contend we have reached the utmost rigor.
The next time we see our friend he tells us he has given it some thought. For
we have shown all models of second-order arithmetic to be isomorphic, but what
exactly is a model? More precisely, what is a set? We play the same game again
and end up with full second-order set theory, which is sufficiently categorical for N
to be uniquely determined in all of its models. He replies:
You showed me semi-categoricity of the second-order set theory you
use. But while doing so, you quantified over sets, taking unions and
intersections of sets and even power sets. How are you justified in
these operations if set theory is the theory you want to build up?
We reply with Henkin semantics, and tell him in this approach his concerns
have been met. For all we need to be comfortable about to use this logic is
Comprehension + Choice2. Of course, he replies we then only have internal semi-
categoricity, so it seems we are back to the start. For cannot the Henkin models
(and hence their internal models of ZFC2) themselves still behave in wild and
unexpected ways?
This also touches on the second question, namely what semi-categoricity in the
context of set theory shows. The discussion above has been obscured in our proofs
by the fact that we took Set in our metatheory as if this were unambiguous. As
our friend showed, it is not.13 But such is life: in building our theories we have to
start from somewhere. Moreover, we do not need logic (nor our friend) to tell us
ambiguity is impossible to root out. When we are doing mathematics, or any other
meaningful endeavor, we are always operating under a set of ‘sanity conditions’.
These need not be explicitly or even implicitly present to our minds. In fact, most
of these ‘conditions’ only come to mind when someone or something is breaking
them, which is hence a misfortune we cannot avoid in advance.
If we do not aim for eternal truth and unambiguous semantics, and accept
there will always be hidden rules of the games we play that can be interpreted in
unforeseeable ways, then the problem we had with our friend can be resolved. For
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we can simply say that our theories work, and that their meaning is derived from
our use. They work to unify various parts of mathematics, to ground our logical
practices and to aid understanding of our theories.14
Thus one should care about semi-categoricity in the context of foundational
theories if one wants to know what is needed to be agreed upon in order to do
unambiguous mathematics, although not all future pathological interpretations can
be ruled out. Hence mathematical foundations point to our current knowledge of
the ‘sanity conditions’ under which we do mathematics. And this, to my mind, is
also what semi-categoricity is about: not eternally existing mathematical entities
‘out there’, but the dynamic structures of our mathematical understanding here
and now.15
Notes
1. With respect to the exact formalism of our set theory, note in all of the mentioned
references the notion of urelements is dropped (as we do). Some authors include the
axiom of existence. We leave this axiom out (as Zermelo did) and take it for granted in
our background logic, because it is irrelevant to our discussion.
2. See for example (Brouwer, 1913, 1949; Frege, 1884; Russell, 1919) for some of these
discussions.
3. The question comes down to whether one demands a model to come with an interpretation
of all variables (as Rautenberg does), or whether a model only interprets closed terms (as
Hodges does). The difference is resolved when one realizes Hodges adds ‘fresh constants’
when he needs to interpret an open formula.
4. Thus, the latter may here be either understood as adding a fresh new constant x to our
language, to be interpreted as x ∈ M, or as picking out an image x ∈ M of x ∈ Var under
the valuation Var→ M associated to M. This of course amounts to the same thing.
5. With ordinals we always mean von Neumann ordinals. Likewise, we always consider
cardinals in the sense of the von Neumann cardinal assignment.
6. For this reason, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory is also called the iterative conception of sets,
where the latter is used to informally justify the former. See e.g. (Boolos, 1971; Parson,
1975).
7. See (Enderton, 1977, Thm. 9L) for a full proof.
8. Note of course this follows after translation into modern term, i.e. when urelements are
discarded and the axiom of infinity is taken into consideration. See the introductory note
by Kanamori (2010).
9. See (Rautenberg, 2010, §3.4) for a proof of Skolem’s paradox. Note this result uses the
fact that our L is finite, and thus countable, but generalizes to languages of any give
cardinality, increasing the lower bound of the cardinality of the non-natural models with
the cardinality of the given language.
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10. There is thus no f ∈ M such that in M the first-order sentence expressing f is a bijection
x→ y holds.
11. Observe the indeterminacy of set theory is not ‘fixable’ in any effective way due to the
results by Gödel.
12. A relativization means we consider interpreted versions of formulae. Thus if ϕ is of the
form ∀x . . . and we relativize ϕ to a model M this becomes ∀x ∈ M . . . .
13. And, as Putnam (1980) points out, this ambiguity cannot be fixed for we can “Skolemize
absolutely everything”, including our metatheory (or our meta-metatheory, or ...).
14. It should be no surprise I draw from Wittgenstein in these reflections, although I do not
want to go into the discussion of interpreting him. In particular, see (Wittgenstein, 1971)
for his thoughts on ‘hinge propositions’, which accord to my ‘sanity conditions’, and
(Wittgenstein, 1967, 1983) for his thoughts on rules and language games. See also Putnam
(1980) who argues taking anything but use (namely something called ‘interpretation’) as
a constituent of meaning is actually at the heart of Skolem’s paradox, which “can only
have crazy solutions”. For “To speak as if this were my problem, ‘I know how to use my
language, but, now how shall I single out an interpretation?’ is to speak nonsense. Either
the use already fixes the ‘interpretation’ or nothing can.”.
15. As an example of the dynamics in foundations, consider the fact the Zermelo sought
arguments for the justification of his axioms from a cumulative conception of sets, on the
basis of intuition. Thus, he took the existence of a large enough chain of ordinals and a
faculty to take ‘full power sets’ as being intelligible, and deduced a cumulative hierarchy
of sets. The latter is then of course a model for his set theory and is therewith intended
as a justification for these axioms (Ebbinghaus, 2006). Zermelo even devised a (we would
say, informal) definition of sets (“a class defined up to isomorphism”). Compare this to
the situation in modern text books, where Zermelo’s axioms are usually given prior to
the notions of ordinals, cumulative hierarchies and models.
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